The non-fire triangle: how a return to principles can improve fire safety

The reporting of the proceedings of the Grenfell Inquiry, led by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, only reinforces the conclusions reached by Dame Judith Hackitt’s independent review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: fire safety in our buildings is not what it should be. 

We should be concerned about this but not surprised. It has been brewing for decades, a mixture of complacency, convenience and cost-saving has left us with a large tranche of our built environment that has been designed and constructed on the basis of hope not certainty. Buildings today are more complex than ever, used in ways we had not envisaged 20 years ago and financed and managed in increasingly convoluted ways. I would contend that to overcome these issues we need to go back to certain principles, ones that we have somehow left behind.

Once we could be reasonably certain what products had been used in the construction of a building; this is no longer the case. In the UK, as globally, we are coming to terms with the fact that our built environment has changed and is continuing to change in radical ways. New materials, new regulations, new techniques, new demands and new regulations have resulted in buildings looking and behaving in quite different ways from ‘traditional’ constructions. Yet, when we look to determine how a building will act in a fire we can be betrayed by our prejudices, our vision of what we would normally expect. We need to shed these blinkers and look forward to how fires will behave in the buildings that have been going up in the past two decades and those that we have yet to build. Relying on historical evidence won’t serve; it would be like steering a ship by looking at its wake alone.

When the Post War Building Studies published the ‘Fire Grading of Buildings’ paper in 1946 they were dealing with buildings that predominantly consisted of brick, steel, wood, tile and concrete. They defined the objective of fire precautions as being ‘to safeguard life and property’ and added that this was to be achieved by following three principles:

a) preventing or reducing the number of outbreaks of fire; 

b) limiting the development and spread of a fire in the event of an outbreak; and 

c) providing for safe exit of occupants. 

It is noteworthy that the current Building Regulations in England and Wales are based on the last principle; the first two are encouraged while the third is required.

Given the plethora of new products and techniques it is becoming increasingly difficult to consistently determine how a building will behave in fire. Large-scale testing is expensive and time consuming and, based on post-Grenfell discussions, less common than many had thought. The outcome of all this is we have been conducting a ‘Real World/Real Time’ experiment on fire behaviour in our current built environment – this includes new builds and refurbished properties. Perhaps the first harbinger of this phenomenon was the Summerland fire in 1973 that killed 50 people. As new materials and techniques have become more common other fires have been more intensive than expected or behaved in unexpected ways. Above are some examples. Just Google them for more detail.

These, and many more, showed evidence of fire behaving differently; some resulted in fatalities, others in massive property damage and huge knock-on impact. This underlines the gap that exists between expectations and regulation. Of course, not all buildings with faulty fire-safety arrangements catch fire. Pacific Wharf, Rotherhithe is somewhat of a ‘poster child’ for this as between 2003 and 2008 an incredible number of defects were found in this supposedly prestige development. Fortunately, the lack of firestopping was found when looking for water leaks rather than after a major conflagration. The building-control body paid out approximately £5.5m to pay for remedial works. So there are undoubtedly other buildings that pose a fire risk. Should we have seen this as a sign of the things to come in our built environment?

A recurring theme in the fires mentioned above and in many other UK fires is that a manager from the company concerned will give a statement along the lines of:

‘In common with all our properties in the UK, the building was fully compliant with all national building and fire regulations.’

In other words, if no one was injured or killed then the building’s fire design was a success. Too often success is seen as compliance – having the paperwork; it would seem to have little to do with the building operating in the way it should in a fire.

Dame Judith heavily criticised behaviours within the construction industry, citing ‘a race to the bottom’ as driving the problems she identified. She stated:

‘The new regulatory framework must be simpler and more effective. It must be truly outcomes-based (rather than based on prescriptive rules and complex guidance) and it must have real teeth, so that it can drive the right behaviours.’

The government is setting up a system with a Building Safety regulator to tackle the issues identified in the Hackitt report. But the problems are not solely confined to the high-risk buildings that are ‘in scope’ for the regulator. They apply to all buildings, and we don’t know in what type of building the next problem will surface.

I would suggest that we need to consider three factors. What outcomes do we wish to achieve, what regulation can best bring about those outcomes and what incentives are needed to gain compliance. 

Starting with outcomes: why have we walked away from property protection? Given the life-safety onus, as long as everyone gets out, the building is viewed as being disposable. Apart from the economic, environmental and social costs this means that the margin for safety is reduced – often to wafer-thin amounts (vide The Hamptons fire). It is also out of line with most expectations. A YouGov survey commissioned by the Business Sprinkler Alliance in 2016 of 442 SME Businesses found that just under 70% believed that if their building complied with the appropriate regulations then it would be protected from fire. It means that the people using the building should be safe from fire. If the building isn’t allowed to burn then people won’t be endangered. It is axiomatic that if you protect the building you protect the people. 

Following on, therefore, fire regulation should be expanded to include property protection; a burn-out should never be viewed as a success. Regulation is too often used as a derogatory term. Any good engineer will tell you that an unregulated machine will break. Perhaps we should distinguish between ‘red tape’ and regulation – the appropriate safeguards to protect the public and the country from the effects of fire. Nor is this radical, as we already make requirements under the building regulations for non-life-safety issues.

AD E Resistance to the passage of sound

AD L Conservation of fuel and power

AD Q Security

AD R Physical infrastructure for high-speed electronic communications networks.

All laudable and all rather pointless if the building has burnt down.

Regarding incentives, Dame Judith referred to the system being ‘gamed’. This is partly driven by the value-engineering mindset that is prevalent, but it is also affected by the fragmented chain between the building’s design, construction and occupation. Simply put, the ‘end user’, the occupier, usually gets what they are given. The design and construction process is of necessity a compromise between cost and quality, but I would suggest that the balance has tipped too far. The measures that were put in place to ensure appropriate quality – Clerks of Works, Building Control, Fire Certification, etc. – have all changed in the last 20 years. Fire Safety Audits under the Fire Safety Order fell by 18% between 2014 and 2019, while prosecutions run at approximately one per week. If the chance of being caught does not affect behaviour we wouldn’t need speed cameras. 

As well as enforcement we also require professional competence. Third-party certification/accreditation is required in many areas of construction, such as gas and electrical safety, but not in fire safety. Despite there being many schemes such as those run by BAFE they are non-mandatory. Enforcement cannot be the only tool to ensure quality, professional oversight, industry standards and specifiers’ requirements all have a role to play. Insurance also has an effect, although it is often over relied upon – ‘It’s OK, we’re insured.’ There are also indications that even with insurance the outcome is not fully considered. A survey by the Chartered Institute of Loss Adjusters on average claims between 2008 and 2017 found that business interruption cover was 50% under insured. Property is generally reckoned to be about 20% underinsured.

Everyone in the fire sector will be familiar with the triangle of fire. In its most simplistic form it demonstrates that a fire will occur when there is sufficient air (oxygen), fuel and heat, and the fire will go out when one of the three elements is reduced below a critical level.

I would suggest we should also have an ‘anti-fire triangle’ to maintain the correct balance between 

• Appropriate, clear regulation
• Proportional, consistent enforcement 
• Demonstrable and accredited competence in all fields 

Balance is the key. There needs to be a connection between our expectations, the outcomes we want and the incentives for all those who play a part. If we apply the regulation without appropriate incentives and safeguards, the system gets gamed. Building Bulletin 100 is a good (or is that bad) example of this. There was a clear expectation when BB 100 was published in 2007, ‘that all new schools should have fire sprinklers installed except in a few low risk schools.’ This is clearly not the case, the National Fire Chief’s Council estimates that in the last five years only 30% of schools that were built in that period were fitted with sprinklers. 

Correctly applied sanctions and incentives will help to achieve what I believe is the expectation of the majority; buildings shouldn’t burn down completely. For many years we were guided by the three principles of: not having a fire, keeping it small and ensuring everyone can escape. Following all three of these principles would reduce the number and severity of fires, therefore reducing the number of fatalities and injuries and reducing the impact to the economy, environment and community. Moreover it will bring the outcomes in line with our expectations – buildings shouldn’t burn. 

For more information, go to www.business-sprinkler-alliance.org 

About the Author

Iain Cox

Chair at Business Sprinkler Alliance |  + postsBio

Although retired Iain is still active in the fire safety sector, working in various bodies and committees to promote fire safety in general, especially promoting third party certification and the greater use of sprinklers. He is Vice Chair of the National Fire Sprinkler Network and leads the Sprinkler Water Liaison Group.

Iain served in Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service for 34 years, appointed Chief Fire Officer in 2003 he was awarded the Queen’s Fire Service Medal in 2009 and retired in 2013. He served as the Chief Fire Officers Association’s Director for Protection and Prevention between 2009 and 2011. Iain is currently the Chair of the Business Sprinkler Alliance and is a board member of BAFE. Iain holds a BSc from Reading University and an MA in Management from Coventry University.

• Iain Cox

  Why fire-safety regulations alone fall short: the issue of disposable buildings
• Iain Cox

  Seconds count: are commercial building owners prepared for fire?
• Iain Cox

  One rule for one, and one for another
• Iain Cox

  When a building burns to the ground, is it a regulatory success?
• Iain Cox

  Are we asking the right questions when it comes to fire risk?
• Iain Cox

  Fire safety in the commercial sector